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Derandomization of auctions
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Authors:
Gagan Aggarwal
Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Amos Fiat
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Andrew V. Goldberg
Microsoft Research, Mountain View, CA
Jason D. Hartline
Microsoft Research, Mountain View, CA
Nicole Immorlica
M.I.T., Cambridge, MA
Madhu Sudan
M.I.T., Cambridge, MA
2005 Article
Bibliometrics
· Downloads (6 Weeks): 2
· Downloads (12 Months): 20
· Citation Count: 10
Published in:
· Proceeding
STOC '05
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2005
table of contents
ISBN:1-58113-960-8
doi>
10.1145/1060590.1060682
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auctions
derandomization
discrete mathematics
mechanism design
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