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Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
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Authors:
Jens Grossklags
UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Nicolas Christin
Carnegie Mellon University, Kobe, Japan
John Chuang
UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
WWW '08
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Pages 209-218
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2008
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-60558-085-2
doi>
10.1145/1367497.1367526
2008 Article
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· Citation Count: 24
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Tags:
economics
economics
economics of the internet
game theory
incentive-centered design and engineering
protection
public goods
reliability
security
security
security
self-insurance
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