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Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
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Authors:
Lirong Xia
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '08
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2008
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-60558-169-9
doi>
10.1145/1386790.1386811
2008 Article
Bibliometrics
· Downloads (6 Weeks): 2
· Downloads (12 Months): 15
· Citation Count: 19
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EC '12
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Tags:
algorithms
computational social choice
economics
economics
frequency of manipulability
multiagent systems
probability of tied elections
theory
voter/manipulator power
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