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No-regret learning and a mechanism for distributed multiagent planning
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Authors:
Jan-P. Calliess
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Geoffrey J. Gordon
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Published in:
· Proceeding
AAMAS '08
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
©2008
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ISBN: 978-0-9817381-0-9
2008 Article
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· Citation Count: 1
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Tags:
algorithms
auctions
design
distributed artificial intelligence
economics
game theory
mechanism design
multiagent learning
multiagent planning
no-regret algorithms
theory
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