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On representing coalitional games with externalities
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Authors:
Tomasz P. Michalak
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom
Talal Rahwan
University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
Jacek Sroka
University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Andrew Dowell
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom
Michael J. Wooldridge
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom
Peter J. McBurney
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom
Nicholas R. Jennings
University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
2009 Article
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· Citation Count: 6
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '09
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pages 11-20
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2009
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-60558-458-4
doi>
10.1145/1566374.1566377
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Tags:
algorithms
coalition structure generation
economics
general
partition function games
representation
theory
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