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Information asymmetries in pay-per-bid auctions
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Authors:
John W. Byers
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Michael Mitzenmacher
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Georgios Zervas
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '10
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pages 1-12
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2010
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ISBN: 978-1-60558-822-3
doi>
10.1145/1807342.1807344
2010 Article
Bibliometrics
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· Downloads (12 Months): 47
· Downloads (cumulative): 247
· Citation Count: 0
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EC '13
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economics
electronic commerce
information asymmetries
pay-per-bid auctions
theory
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