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Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstract
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Authors:
Jon Feldman
Google Research, New York, NY, USA
Vahab Mirrokni
Google Research, New York, NY, USA
S. Muthukrishnan
Google Research, New York, NY, USA
Mallesh M. Pai
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
2010 Article
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· Downloads (12 Months): 109
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· Citation Count: 3
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '10
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pages 23-32
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2010
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ISBN: 978-1-60558-822-3
doi>
10.1145/1807342.1807346
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ad exchanges
design
economics
economics
intermediaries
optimal auctions
theory
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