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Representing Bayesian games without a common prior
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Authors:
Dimitrios Antos
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Avi Pfeffer
Charles River Analytics, Cambridge, MA
Published in:
· Proceeding
AAMAS '10
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Pages 1457-1458
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
©2010
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ISBN: 978-0-9826571-1-9
2010 Article
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Tags:
bayesian games
belief hierarchy
common prior assumption
distributed artificial intelligence
economics
equilibrium
formalism
game theory
human factors
knowledge requirements
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