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False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
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Authors:
Mingyu Guo
Duke University, Durham, NC
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University, Durham, NC
Published in:
· Proceeding
AAMAS '10
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Pages 1475-1476
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
©2010
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ISBN: 978-0-9826571-1-9
2010 Article
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Tags:
combinatorial auctions
distributed artificial intelligence
economics
economics
false-name-proof
mechanism design
theory
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