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Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents
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Authors:
Shuchi Chawla
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Madison, WI, USA
David L. Malec
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Madison, WI, USA
Azarakhsh Malekian
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '11
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pages 253-262
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2011
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ISBN: 978-1-4503-0261-6
doi>
10.1145/1993574.1993613
2011 Article
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· Citation Count: 2
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algorithms
bayesian mechanism design
budgets
economics
economics
revenue
theory
welfare
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