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From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
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Authors:
Shaddin Dughmi
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Tim Roughgarden
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Qiqi Yan
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
STOC '11
Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pages 149-158
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2011
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-4503-0691-1
doi>
10.1145/1993636.1993657
2011 Article
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· Downloads (cumulative): 262
· Citation Count: 13
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Tags:
algorithmic mechanism design
algorithms
combinatorial auctions
economics
general
theory
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