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Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
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Authors:
Xiaohui Bei
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Ning Chen
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Nick Gravin
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Pinyan Lu
Microsoft Research Asia, Beijing, China
2012 Article
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Published in:
· Proceeding
STOC '12 Proceedings of the 44th symposium on Theory of Computing
Pages 449-458
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2012
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-4503-1245-5
doi>
10.1145/2213977.2214020
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Tags:
approximation
bayesian
budget feasible
distributed commercial transactions
economics
mechanism design
prior-free
subadditive
submodular
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