Optimal mechanisms for selling information

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Authors: Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Mountain View, CA, USA
Robert Kleinberg Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Renato Paes Leme Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Published in:
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· Proceeding
EC '12 Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages 92-109
ACM New York, NY, USA ©2012
table of contents ISBN: 978-1-4503-1415-2 doi>10.1145/2229012.2229024
Optimal mechanisms for selling information Published by ACM 2012 Article
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· Downloads (6 Weeks): 8
· Downloads (12 Months): 92
· Downloads (cumulative): 92
· Citation Count: 2


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