SIGN IN
SIGN UP
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Full Text:
PDF
Buy this Article
Authors:
Constantinos Daskalakis
MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
Seth Matthew Weinberg
MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '12
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages 370-387
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2012
table of contents
ISBN: 978-1-4503-1415-2
doi>
10.1145/2229012.2229042
2012 Article
Bibliometrics
· Downloads (6 Weeks): 7
· Downloads (12 Months): 96
· Downloads (cumulative): 96
· Citation Count: 1
Tools and Resources
Buy this Article
Request Permissions
TOC Service:
Email
RSS
Save to Binder
Export Formats:
BibTeX
EndNote
ACM Ref
Upcoming Conference:
EC '13
Share:
|
Tags:
algorithms
auction theory
design
economics
general
multi-dimensional mechanism design
pricing
revenue optimization
symmetries
theory
Feedback
|
Switch to
single page view
(no tabs)
**Javascript is not enabled and is required for the "tabbed view" or switch to the
single page view
**
Powered by
The ACM Guide to Computing Literature
All Tags
Export Formats
Save to Binder