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Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets
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Authors:
Michal Feldman
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Harvard University, Jerusalem, Israel
Amos Fiat
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Stefano Leonardi
Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
Piotr Sankowski
University of Warsaw and Sapienza University of Rome, Warsaw, Poland
2012 Article
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Published in:
· Proceeding
EC '12
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages 532-549
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2012
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ISBN: 978-1-4503-1415-2
doi>
10.1145/2229012.2229052
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Tags:
economics
envy-free
multi-unit auctions with budgetes
revenue-maximizing
social and behavioral sciences
theory
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