An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents

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Authors: Aaron Archer Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Christos Papadimitriou University of California, Berkeley, CA
Kunal Talwar University of California, Berkeley, CA
Éva Tardos Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents 2003 Article
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· Proceeding
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Pages 205-214
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Philadelphia, PA, USA ©2003
table of contents ISBN:0-89871-538-5

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