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False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values
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Authors:
Kenji Terada
NTT Corporation, Tokyo, Japan
Makoto Yokoo
NTT Corporation, Kyoto, Japan
Published in:
· Proceeding
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
ACM
New York, NY
, USA
©2003
table of contents
ISBN:1-58113-683-8
doi>
10.1145/860575.860630
2003 Article
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· Downloads (12 Months): 6
· Citation Count: 4
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Tags:
economics
false-name-proof
mechanism design
multi-unit auction
multiagent systems
theory
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