Making Sense of Reference to the Unfamiliar

Helen Seville and Allan Ramsay*

Centre for Computational Linguistics

UMIST, PO Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, England

heleng/allan@ccl.umist.ac.uk

Abstract

Computational approaches to reference resolution, like Centering Theory, are best at resolving referring expressions which denote familiar referents. We demonstrate how, by taking a proof-theoretic approach to reference resolution within a Centering-type framework, we are able to make sense of referring expressions for unfamiliar referents. These include, in addition to bridging descriptions, definite descriptions like “the first man” and “the first snowdrops of Spring”. We claim that the first of these denotes a unique subset of a plural discourse antecedent. While the second has no discourse antecedent, we similarly treat it as denoting a unique subset of a familiar referent.

1 Introduction

How do referring expressions denote? According to Russell, a definite description such as “the King of France”, denotes a unique individual by virtue of its meaning. But, according to Familiarity Theory (Heim, 1983), referring expressions need not denote uniquely by virtue of their meaning as they refer to individuals made familiar by the discourse or other context. This observation plays a key role in Centering Theory (Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Grosz et al., 1995) and other computational approaches in which referring expressions are resolved by locating their antecedents in the discourse. The reference of pronouns like “he”, definite descriptions like “the woman”, and referential tenses like “had” clearly has more to do with salience in context than with uniqueness of meaning. Similarly, while names like “Mary” need not denote individuals prominent in the discourse context,

they must nevertheless denote individuals familiar to conversants if they are successfully to refer. However, there is another class of referring expressions in relation to which we believe the concept of uniqueness of meaning does have an essential role to play. These include such definite descriptions as “the first man” and “the first snowdrop of Spring”, along with such variations on these as “the first three men” and “the first snowdrops of Spring”.

In implementing a system of reference resolution, we have attempted to reconcile the notions of familiarity and uniqueness. This enables us to dereference expressions like “the first snowdrop of Spring” in a unified framework alongside anaphors¹, pronouns, referential tenses, names, and other definite descriptions like “the man”.

- (1) *Two men* arrived.
- (2) *The first man* spoke.

In the case of a referring expression like “the first man”, there may be an antecedent of sorts in the discourse, but it is not the individual referred to (or indeed an individual at all). We will say that the antecedent “two men” introduces a set, and that the referring expression “the first man” denotes, by virtue of the meaning of *first*, a unique subset of this familiar set.

- (1) Mary saw *the first snowdrop of Spring*.

In the case of “the first snowdrop of Spring”, there need be no explicit antecedent in the discourse. We will say that, in the same way that “Mary” denotes a familiar individual, “the snowdrops of Spring” denotes a familiar set, or

* We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful comments.

¹We use this term to distinguish reflexives like “herself” from pronouns like “he” and “him”.

property. Again, by virtue of the meaning of *first*, “the first snowdrop of Spring” can be said to denote a unique subset of the familiar set. We will not claim that it denotes a unique *individual*, but that rather it denotes a unique subset of the specified cardinality, i.e., 1. This treatment has the advantage that it extends to plural referring expressions.

Below we outline the approach we have developed to the representation and resolution of referring expressions, before discussing in more detail its extension to deal with unfamiliar referents.

2 A Framework for Reference Resolution

Our framework for reference resolution has been implemented in the system of language understanding described in (Ramsay, 1999). The starting point for reference resolution is the logical form we obtain from parsing. For example, the following is the logical form we get for the utterance “Mary slept.”

$$\begin{aligned} \exists A : \{ & A \text{ is interval } \& \\ & \text{ends_before}(\text{ref}(\lambda B(\text{speech_time}(B, 1))), A) \} \\ \exists C : \{ & \text{aspect}(\text{simple}, A, C) \} \\ & \theta(C, \text{agent}, \text{ref}(\lambda D(\text{named}(D, \text{Mary}) \\ & \qquad \qquad \qquad \& \text{card}(D, 1)))) \\ & \& \text{slept}(C) \\ & \& C \text{ is event} \end{aligned}$$

We use the inference engine described in (Ramsay and Seville, 2000) to update the discourse model with a new discourse state containing the information explicitly represented in the logical form together with any further inferences which are licensed given the existing discourse model. Reference resolution, which involves carrying out a proof that a referring expression denotes, is implemented as part of the update step. We anchor a referring expression like $\text{ref}(\lambda D(\text{named}(D, \text{Mary}) \& \text{card}(D, 1)))$ in the discourse model by proving the existence of an entity in the model which satisfies the properties specified by the referring expression, in this case $\lambda D(\text{named}(D, \text{Mary}) \& \text{card}(D, 1))^2$.

²Strictly speaking, it is a set which is denoted. For readability, our referring expressions conflate the properties of sets and their members. In this case, the cardinality is a property of the set denoted, but the name Mary is a property of its member.

Given that many referring expressions do not in themselves denote uniquely, however, we need a theory of reference resolution to enable us to obtain the appropriate (i.e., *intended*) referent for any referring expression. We incorporate our theory of reference resolution into the actual representation of referring expressions; for example, we label anaphors with the property “salient” and pronouns (and also referential tenses) with the property “centred”³:

“himself”
 $\text{ref}(\lambda X(\text{salient}(X, \text{ref}(\lambda D(\text{cde}(D)))) \& m(X)))$
 “she”
 $\text{ref}(\lambda X(\text{centred}(X, \text{ref}(\lambda D(\text{cde}(D)))) \& f(X)))$

Reference resolution relies on maintaining, as in Centering Theory, a list of forward-looking centres for each discourse state (corresponding to an utterance) in the discourse. Furthermore, for the purposes of reference resolution, the discourse states themselves are organized into a discourse tree, which is constructed automatically based on referential cues⁴, as described in (Seville, 1999).

The nodes in such a tree correspond to discourse states. Those on the right-hand frontier are *open*, which essentially means that the entities mentioned in them are available to pronominal reference.

The process of reference resolution for the various referring expressions can be briefly described as follows. Anaphors, characterised as *salient*, are resolved to a less oblique argument of the same verb (Pollard and Sag, 1994) within the current discourse state, which is constructed

³Here $\text{ref}(\lambda D(\text{cde}(D)))$ is a reference to the current discourse state and the properties *m* and *f* refer to male and female gender respectively.

⁴The tree illustrated was constructed using pronominal cues. Each discourse state was attached as a daughter of the highest node in the discourse tree to which all pronouns and referential tenses (like *had*) mentioned in it could be anchored.

incrementally. We also start our search for the referents of pronouns and other *centred* entities in the current discourse state, which is necessary if we are to resolve such referring expressions as “her” in “Mary took John with *her*.” However, referring expressions containing the property *centred* are prevented from being dereferenced to *salient* entities, thus ensuring that the constraint of *disjoint reference* is met. If we fail to find the centred entity in the current discourse state, we search the previous open node and, if necessary, further open nodes in the discourse tree, in order to deal with long-distance pronominalisation. The dereferencing of other referring expressions like $ref(\lambda D(named(D, Mary) \& card(D, 1)))$ is similar but less constrained in that we consider entities mentioned in *all* nodes mentioned in the discourse tree, whether open or closed, in order of recency. This means that, essentially, names and definite descriptions are dereferenced to the most recently mentioned referent which is appropriate. Unlike in the case of pronouns, we also consider Discourse State 0, which doesn’t correspond to an utterance but, rather, contains the background knowledge assumed in the model. This is how we are able to deal with the first mention of a familiar referent like Mary (assuming that the properties $\lambda D(named(D, Mary) \& card(D, 1))$ suffice to distinguish a particular entity in Discourse State 0 from all the others).

Our approach extends naturally to cases like “the first snowdrop of Spring” because it is proof-theoretic and so able to exploit background knowledge in reference resolution. This can be illustrated, in the first instance, by examining the background knowledge which is used in updating the utterance “Mary slept.” The update step for this utterance yields Discourse State 1, containing (amongst others) the following facts:

Discourse State 1

$sleep(\#134)$
 $\theta(\#134, agent, \#94)$
 $ends_before(\#4(1), \#133)$
 $aspect(simple, \#133, \#134)$

We were able to prove $named(\#94, Mary)$ and $card(\#94, 1)$ and so dereference

$ref(\lambda D(named(D, Mary) \& card(D, 1)))$ as the following were amongst the facts contained in Discourse State 0:

Discourse State 0

$female(\#94)$
 $named(\#94, Mary)$
 $woman(\#94)$
 $f(\#94)$
 $card(\#94, 1)$
 $adult(\#94)$

These were generated from the lexical meaning postulates we stipulated for “Mary”, “woman”, and “female”:

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists X(named(X, Mary) \& woman(X) \& card(X, 1)) \\ &\forall X(woman(X) \rightarrow \\ &\quad female(X) \& (X \text{ is human}) \& adult(X)) \\ &\forall X(female(X) \rightarrow f(X)) \end{aligned}$$

3 Unfamiliar Referents

In this section we show how, within the framework above, we are able to make sense of a variety of referring expressions denoting unfamiliar referents. The most straightforward of these are bridging descriptions, so we start with these.

3.1 Bridging Descriptions

(1) Mary loves *her mother*.

In this first case, “her mother”, contains a referring expression nested within it. Having dereferenced this, the knowledge that *mother of* is a function enables us to obtain a unique referent. Our representation of the referring expression to be dereferenced is as follows:

“her mother”
 $ref(\lambda B(of(B,$
 $\quad \lambda F(mother(F)),$
 $\quad ref(\lambda G(salient_or_centred(G, 1)$
 $\quad \quad \& f(G))))$
 $\quad \& card(B, 1)))$

The first step involves anchoring the referring expression by dereferencing its nested referring expression for “her”⁵.

⁵The referent for this is characterised as *salient_or_centred* as we allow possessive pronouns to be dereferenced as anaphors or, failing that, as pronouns.

Current Model

ends_at_or_after(#4(1), #135)
aspect(*simple*, #135, #136)
 θ (#136, *agent*, #94)
love(#136)

The partially constructed current discourse state we have when we do our dereferencing is as shown. “Mary” has already been dereferenced to #94 and this has been entered into the list of forward-looking centres for the current utterance. We are able to prove both *salient*(#94) and *f*(#94), and so our nested referring expression is dereferenced to this entity.

ref(λB (*of*(*B*,
 λF (*mother*(*F*)),
#94)
& *card*(*B*, 1)))

It is then a straightforward matter to dereference the anchored referring expression, given the following facts in Discourse State 0:

Discourse State 0

mother(#60(#94))
of(#60(#94), λA (*mother*(*A*)), #94)
f(#60(#94))
card(#60(#94), 1)

These derive from our meaning postulates for “mother”⁶ and “of”:

$$\forall X((X \text{ is animal}) \& \text{card}(X, 1) \rightarrow$$

$$\exists Y(\text{of}(Y, \lambda Z(\text{mother}(Z)), X)$$

$$\& \text{card}(Y, 1) \& f(Y)))$$

$$\forall X \forall Y \forall Z(\text{of}(X, Y, Z) \rightarrow Y.X)$$

Dealing with other bridging descriptions is more complicated:

- (1) Mary saw *a house*.
- (2) She found *the door*.

In order to give an analogous treatment to the referring expression “the door”, we have to treat it as elliptical for an expression containing a nested referring expression, i.e., “the door *of the house*”. In the same way that we have a meaning postulate for the relation *mother of*, we have one for the relation *door of*:

⁶Skolemization preserves the dependency of Y on X, i.e., #94 is present in #60(#94).

$$\forall X((\text{house}(X) \vee \text{car}(X)) \rightarrow$$

$$\exists Y(\text{of}(Y, \lambda Z(\text{door}(Z)), X) \& \text{card}(Y, 1)))$$

This means that, having used utterance (1) above to update the discourse model, we have the following amongst the facts in Discourse State 1:

Discourse State 1

*see*1(#138)
 θ (#138, *agent*, #94)
 θ (#138, *object*, #139)
card(#139, 1)
house(#139)
ends_before(#4(1), #137)
door(#46(#139))
entrance(#46(#139))
of(#46(#139), λA (*door*(*A*)), #139)
card(#46(#139), 1)
aspect(*simple*, #137, #138)

In updating utterance (2), the bridging description which needs to be dereferenced has the following representation:

ref(λE (*door*(*E*) & *card*(*E*, 1)))

Since we cannot guarantee that there will only be a single entity in our model satisfying the properties λE (*door*(*E*) & *card*(*E*, 1)), we want to ensure that the referent we obtain is either the most recently mentioned or *that with the most recently mentioned antecedent*, i.e., in this case, the house #139. Our reference resolution procedure exploits the fact that the house, #139, is explicitly represented in the forward looking centres of Discourse State 1 and that the intended referent, #46(#139), is clearly a function of this (its dependency having been preserved by Skolemization). In considering the potential referents for our referring expression in order of recency, we attempt to prove, not simply, for each referent, *X*, whether *door*(*X*) and *card*(*X*, 1), but *door*(*Y*) and *card*(*Y*, 1) where *Y* is a function of *X*. Since #46(#139) is a function of the antecedent #139, we obtain the appropriate referent in this case by proving *door*(#46(#139)) and *card*(#46(#139), 1).

3.2 Superlatives

We are now in a position to describe our treatment of the superlatives discussed in the introduction. First, we consider a case in which there is a discourse antecedent of sorts:

- (1) *Two men* arrived.
- (2) *The first man* spoke.

Discourse State 1 contains the following facts:

Discourse State 1

arrive(#107)
0(#107, *agent*, #108)
card(#108, 2)
man(#108)
male(#108)
m(#108)
adult(#108)
ends_before(#4(1), #106)
aspect(*simple*, #106, #107)

Our representation of the referring expression “the first man” is as follows:

$ref(\lambda B(most(B,$
 $\lambda C(early(C, \lambda D(man(D)))),$
 $ref(\lambda E(man(E))))$
 $\& card(B, 1))))$

The nested referring expression $ref(\lambda E(man(E)))$ can be straightforwardly dereferenced in this case to give the anchored referring expression:

$ref(\lambda B(most(B,$
 $\lambda C(early(C, \lambda D(man(D))))$
 $\#108$
 $\& card(B, 1))))$

Dereferencing this then involves our meaning postulate for superlatives:

$$\forall X \forall Z \forall C (card(Z, C) \& (Z \equiv X) \& (\neg C = 1) \& \\ \forall N \forall P (\neg most(X, P, \neg) \rightarrow \\ \exists Y (most(Y, P, X) \& card(Y, N))))$$

This simply says that for any set X , any property P and any N , there is some set Y containing the N “most P ” members of X . This meaning postulate does not translate into any facts in Discourse State 0, but remains as a rule. When we have a particular referring expression to dereference, this rule enables us to prove that:

$most(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108),$
 $\lambda C(early(C, \lambda D(man(D))))$
 $\#108)$
 $card(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108),$
 $1)$

In this way, we prove that the referring expression makes sense, i.e., denotes. However, unlike in the previous cases, we do not dereference to a familiar referent. There are no existing facts in the database about the referent $\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108)$. Instead, in this case, we have to add to Discourse State 2 the facts we have proved.

Discourse state 2

speak(#112)
theta(#112, *agent*,
 $\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108))$
ends_before(#4(2), #111)
speech_time(#4(2), 2)
aspect(*simple*, #111, #112)
 $most(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108),$
 $\lambda C(early(C, \lambda D(man(D))))$
 $\#108)$
 $card(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108),$
 $1)$

$early(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108),$
 $\lambda C(man(C)))$
 $man(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108))$
 $male(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108))$
 $m(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108))$
 $adult(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), 1, 2, \#108, \#108))$

The further facts we prove, about our referent being early, male, etc., are required if we are to be able to subsequently refer to it using referring expressions such as “he”. These are generated from a set of associated meaning postulates:

$$\forall X \forall Y \forall P ((ordered(P) \& most(Y, P, X)) \rightarrow P.Y) \\ \forall A (ordered(\lambda B(early(B, A)))) \\ \forall X \forall P (early(X, P) \rightarrow P.X) \\ \forall X (man(X) \rightarrow \\ (X \text{ is human}) \& male(X) \& adult(X)) \\ \forall X (male(X) \rightarrow m(X))$$

In addition to these, we have two further meaning postulates for superlatives:

$$\forall X \forall Y \forall P \forall C \forall Z (most(Y, P, X) \& card(Y, C) \\ \& most(Z, P, X) \& card(Z, C) \\ \rightarrow Z = Y) \\ \forall X \forall P \forall Y \forall N \forall C (most(X, P, Y) \& \\ card(X, N) \& card(Y, C) \\ \rightarrow \neg more(N, C))$$

The first of these, the uniqueness meaning postulate, states that if there are two subsets of a set which share the same cardinality and the same superlative property, such as *first*, then they must be regarded as identical⁷. The second simply ensures that any unfamiliar referent which we obtain via our meaning postulates can sensibly be regarded as a proper subset of its antecedent; that is, it prevents us regarding “two men” as a potential antecedent of “the first men”:

- (1) *Two men*_i arrived.
- (2) *The first men**_{f(i)} spoke.

Our treatment of superlatives without discourse antecedents is similar to that above.

- (1) Mary saw *the first snowdrops of Spring*.

There is just one major difference.

$$\begin{aligned} &ref(\lambda E (most(E, \\ &\quad \lambda F(early(F, \\ &\quad \quad \lambda G(of(G, \\ &\quad \quad \quad \lambda H(snowdrop(H)), \\ &\quad \quad \quad ref(\lambda I(named(I, \\ &\quad \quad \quad \quad Spring) \\ &\quad \quad \quad \quad \&card(I, 1)))))), \\ &\quad ref(\lambda J(of(J, \\ &\quad \quad \lambda K(snowdrop(K)), \\ &\quad \quad ref(\lambda L(named(L, Spring) \\ &\quad \quad \quad \&card(L, 1)))))), \\ &\quad \&card(E, pl))) \end{aligned}$$

The representation we obtain for the referring expression “the first snowdrops of Spring” is shown above. Like that for “the first man”, this contains a nested referring expression:

$$\begin{aligned} &ref(\lambda J(of(J, \\ &\quad \lambda K(snowdrop(K)), \\ &\quad ref(\lambda L(named(L, Spring) \\ &\quad \quad \&card(L, 1)))))) \end{aligned}$$

The difference is that, in this case, there is no discourse antecedent for the nested referring expression. This means that, in order to

⁷Practically, this meaning postulate seems to be redundant. Our meaning postulates generate for us only one such subset and it is impossible for another to be introduced through the discourse as “a first man” is ungrammatical.

anchor our referring expression by dereferencing the referring expression nested within it, we need to introduce a meaning postulate for the nested referent (and one for its nested referent, *Spring*):

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists X(season(X) \&named(X, Spring) \&card(X, 1)) \\ &\exists X(of(X, \\ &\quad \lambda Y(snowdrop(Y)), \\ &\quad ref(\lambda Z(named(Z, Spring)))) \\ &\quad \&card(X, pl)) \end{aligned}$$

These meaning postulates simply introduce into Discourse State 0 the fact that there are snowdrops of Spring, in the same way that the meaning postulate for “Mary” introduced the fact that there is a singleton set containing an individual so named.

Discourse state 0

$$\begin{aligned} &season(\#98) \\ &named(\#98, Spring) \\ &card(\#98, 1) \\ &extended(\#98) \\ &snowdrop(\#101) \\ &of(\#101, \lambda(A, snowdrop(A)), \#98) \\ &n(\#101) \\ &card(\#101, pl) \end{aligned}$$

Given the above facts in Discourse State 0, anchoring our referring expression is straightforward.

$$\begin{aligned} &ref(\lambda E(most(E, \\ &\quad \lambda F(early(F, \\ &\quad \quad \lambda G(of(G, \\ &\quad \quad \quad \lambda H(snowdrop(H)), \\ &\quad \quad \quad \quad \#98))))), \\ &\quad \quad \#101) \\ &\quad \quad \&card(E, pl))) \end{aligned}$$

From this point onwards, the proof that this referring expression denotes proceeds in the same way as in the previous example. Given the meaning postulates for superlatives, we are able to prove:

$$\begin{aligned} &most(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), pl, pl, \#101, \#101), \\ &\quad \lambda D(early(D, \\ &\quad \quad \lambda E(of(E, \lambda F(snowdrop(F)), \#98))))), \\ &\quad \#101) \\ &card(\#81(\lambda A(early(A, \dots)), pl, pl, \#101, \#101), \\ &\quad pl) \end{aligned}$$

Again, as in the example above, the facts we have proved concern an unfamiliar referent, and so have to be added to the current discourse state.

Discourse state 1

```

see1(#107)
theta(#107, agent, #94)
theta(#107,
  object,
  #81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101))
ends_before(#4(1), #106)
aspect(simple, #106, #107)
most(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101),
   $\lambda D$ (early( $D$ ,
     $\lambda E$ (of( $E$ ,  $\lambda F$ (snowdrop( $F$ )), #98))),
    #101)
card(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101),
  pl)
early(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101),
   $\lambda D$ (of( $D$ ,  $\lambda E$ (snowdrop( $E$ )),
    #98)))
of(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101),
   $\lambda D$ (snowdrop( $D$ )),
  #98)
snowdrop(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), ...)
n(#81( $\lambda(A, \dots), \#98$ ))), pl, pl, #101, #101))

```

4 Conclusion

We have shown how, by taking a proof-theoretic approach to reference resolution, we can extend a Centering-type framework to make sense of referring expressions for a variety of unfamiliar referents. Having made sense of such referring expressions, we add their referents to our discourse model. This is how we would normally deal with indefinites rather than definites. However, this approach makes perfect sense, given our treatment of such referring expressions as denoting unfamiliar subsets of familiar referents (regarded as sets). We claim that we are able to use definite descriptions to refer to the referents in question, despite their unfamiliarity, so long as we can prove that, by virtue of their meaning, they denote uniquely.

Having implemented our approach in a system of language understanding which already deals with a wide variety of referring expressions, we have demonstrated its practicality. It also has interesting theoretical implications, since it suggests a way in which pragmatic theo-

ries of reference resolution, like Familiarity Theory, and semantic theories, like Russell's, may be reconciled. However, it is fair to say that the success of the approach is not yet proven. This is because we have yet to show that we can deal with a set of related referring expressions within a single framework. The following example illustrates the kinds of cases we have in mind:

- (1) *Three men_i* ate.
- (2) *Two men_j* slept.
- (3) *The first men_i* died.

Here, "first" in "the first men" is clearly performing a different, discourse-related function from that it plays in the cases we have been considering. We have yet to tackle such difficult cases but, since they seem to require reasoning about sets, we believe that our inference-based approach to reference resolution is a good place to start.

References

- B. J. Grosz and C. L. Sidner. 1986. Attention, intentions, and the structure of discourse. *Computational Linguistics*, 12(3):175–204.
- B. J. Grosz, A. K. Joshi, and S. Weinstein. 1995. Centering: A framework for modeling the local coherence of discourse. *Computational Linguistics*, 21(2):203–225.
- I. Heim. 1983. File change semantics and the familiarity theory of definiteness. In R. Bauerle, C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, editors, *Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language*, pages 164–189. de Gruyter, Berlin.
- C. Pollard and I. A. Sag. 1994. *Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar*. University of Chicago Press, London.
- A. Ramsay and Helen Seville. 2000. Models and discourse models. *Journal of Language and Computation*, 1(2):159–174. forthcoming.
- A. Ramsay. 1999. Does it make any sense? updating = consistency checking. In K. Turner, editor, *The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View*. Elsevier Science B.V.
- H. Seville. 1999. Experiments with discourse structure. In *Third International Workshop on Computational Semantics*, pages 233–246, Tilburg.