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 Evangelos Markakis

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Average citations per article13.36
Citation Count775
Publication count58
Publication years2001-2017
Available for download17
Average downloads per article419.82
Downloads (cumulative)7,137
Downloads (12 Months)983
Downloads (6 Weeks)79
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59 results found Export Results: bibtexendnoteacmrefcsv

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1 published by ACM
December 2017 ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG): Volume 13 Issue 4, December 2017
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 16,   Downloads (12 Months): 19,   Downloads (Overall): 19

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We study the problem of computing maximin share allocations, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of n agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of an agent is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she is allowed to partition the goods in any way ...
Keywords: Fair division, maximin share

2 published by ACM
June 2017 EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 13,   Downloads (12 Months): 112,   Downloads (Overall): 112

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Deferred-acceptance (DA) auctions} are mechanisms that are based on backward-greedy algorithms and possess a number of remarkable incentive properties, including implementation as an obviously-strategyproof ascending auction. All existing work on DA auctions considers only binary single-parameter problems, where each bidder either ``wins'' or ``loses.'' This paper generalizes the DA auction ...
Keywords: deferred-acceptance auctions, approximation algorithms, mechanism design, social welfare, scheduling

3 published by ACM
June 2017 EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 13,   Downloads (12 Months): 530,   Downloads (Overall): 530

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We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose ...
Keywords: fair division of indivisible items, mechanism design without money, envy-freeness up to one item, maximin share fairness

4
May 2017 AAMAS '17: Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 6,   Downloads (Overall): 6

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In recent years, there has been increasing interest within the computational social choice community regarding models where voters are biased towards specific behaviors or have secondary preferences. An important representative example of this approach is the model of truth bias, where voters prefer to be honest about their preferences, unless ...
Keywords: voting, truth-bias, dynamics

5
December 2016 WINE 2016: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 10123
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We study a type of reverse procurement auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same time maximize a given valuation function. This ...

6
July 2016 IJCAI'16: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of n players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition the items in any way she prefers, into n ...

7
July 2016 Theory of Computing Systems: Volume 59 Issue 1, July 2016
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by ...
Keywords: Sponsored search, Second price, Auctions, Keyword auctions

8
May 2016 AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0,   Downloads (12 Months): 7,   Downloads (Overall): 19

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We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, such as the domains of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences. We focus on the Plurality rule, and, following the recent work of Elkind et al.[15], consider three popular tie-breaking rules (lexicographic, random-candidate, and random-voter) ...
Keywords: algorithms, plurality, nash equilibrium, single-crossing, single-peaked

9
March 2016 Artificial Intelligence: Volume 232 Issue C, March 2016
Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers Ltd.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of coalitions among agents. These settings can be represented by characteristic function games, also known as coalitional games, equipped with interaction graphs. An interaction graph determines the set of all feasible coalitions, in that a coalition C can ...
Keywords: Computational complexity, Marginal contribution networks, Coalitional games, Solution concepts, Treewidth

10
October 2015 Theory of Computing Systems: Volume 57 Issue 3, October 2015
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We study the Uniform Price Auction, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats in Auction Theory, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the Uniform Price Auction encourages strategic bidding and is generally inefficient, due ...
Keywords: Uniform price auction, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, Price of anarchy, Submodular valuation functions

11
September 2015 ADT 2015: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory - Volume 9346
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria NE, many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote ...

12
May 2015 AAMAS '15: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 7
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0,   Downloads (12 Months): 8,   Downloads (Overall): 36

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We study multiple referenda and committee elections, when the ballot of each voter is simply a set of approved binary issues (or candidates). Two well-known rules under this model are the commonly used candidate-wise majority, also called the minisum rule, as well as the minimax rule. In the former, the ...
Keywords: approval voting, minimax, minisum, ordered weighted averaging operators

13
May 2015 AAMAS '15: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 14,   Downloads (Overall): 26

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It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote ...
Keywords: multi-agent systems

14
January 2015 AAAI'15: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 3

Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under the plurality rule. Our focus is on providing a better understanding regarding the set of equilibria attainable by iterative voting processes. We start with ...

15
January 2015 AAAI'15: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent can modify his vote towards a better outcome for himself. It is already known that if the iteration dynamics (the manner in which ...

16
July 2014 AAAI'14: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences (valuation functions) over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for ...

17
July 2014 Fundamenta Informaticae: Volume 129 Issue 3, July 2014
Publisher: IOS Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alternatives. We characterize social networks for which adoption of a product by the whole network is possible respectively necessary and the ones for which a unique outcome ...

18
May 2014 AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 14,   Downloads (Overall): 53

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Participatory Sensing concerns the sharing of sensor information within user communities, forming a body of knowledge that can be beneficial to the community itself, either directly or through specialized applications. We introduce a framework for a marketplace where such applications can sell and buy sensor information. We focus on the ...
Keywords: mechanism design, participatory sensing, cost-sharing

19
May 2014 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research: Volume 50 Issue 1, May 2014
Publisher: AI Access Foundation
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

Overlapping Coalition Formation (OCF) games, introduced by Chalkiadakis, Elkind, Markakis, Polukarov and Jennings in 2010, are cooperative games where players can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Capturing the notion of stability in OCF games is a difficult task: deviating players may continue to contribute resources to joint projects with non-deviators, ...

20
October 2013 Journal of Scheduling: Volume 16 Issue 5, October 2013
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

We study temperature-aware scheduling problems under the model introduced in [Chrobak et al. AAIM 2008 ], where unit-length jobs of given heat contributions and common release dates are to be scheduled on a set of parallel identical processors. We consider three optimization criteria: makespan, maximum temperature and (weighted) average temperature. ...
Keywords: Temperature-aware scheduling, Inapproximability, Approximation algorithms, Identical processors



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