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 Rakesh V Vohra

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Average citations per article9.23
Citation Count489
Publication count53
Publication years1987-2017
Available for download14
Average downloads per article239.79
Downloads (cumulative)3,357
Downloads (12 Months)392
Downloads (6 Weeks)32
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53 results found Export Results: bibtexendnoteacmrefcsv

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1 published by ACM
December 2017 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on Wine'15: Volume 5 Issue 4, December 2017
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 5,   Downloads (Overall): 5

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A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent’s value or opportunity cost for the item is his private information, and preferences are quasilinear. Trade between agents employs a double oral auction (DOA) in which both buyers and ...
Keywords: Double oral auction

2 published by ACM
June 2017 EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 64,   Downloads (Overall): 64

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We consider settings in which we wish to incentivize myopic agents (such as Airbnb landlords, who may emphasize short-term profits and property safety) to treat arriving clients fairly , in order to prevent overall discrimination against individuals or groups. We model such settings in both classical and contextual bandit models ...

3 published by ACM
June 2017 EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 4,   Downloads (12 Months): 57,   Downloads (Overall): 57

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The problem of finding stable matches that meet distributional concerns is usually formulated by imposing various side constraints. Prior work has focused on constraints whose "right hand sides" are absolute numbers specified before the preferences or number of agents on the "proposing" side are known. In many cases it is ...
Keywords: scarf's lemma, market design, matching market

4 published by ACM
September 2016 ACM SIGecom Exchanges: Volume 15 Issue 1, July 2016
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 17,   Downloads (Overall): 17

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A Walrasian equilibrium outcome has a remarkable property: the induced allocation maximizes social welfare while each buyer receives a bundle that maximizes her individual surplus at the given prices. There are, however, two caveats. First, minimal Walrasian prices necessarily induce indifferences. Thus, without coordination, buyers may choose surplus maximizing bundles ...
Keywords: minimal Walrasian equilibrium, pseudodimension, genericity, overdemand

5 published by ACM
July 2016 EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 55,   Downloads (Overall): 98

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Under full substitutability of preferences, it has been shown that a competitive equilibrium exists in trading networks, and is equivalent (after a restriction to equilibrium trades) to (chain) stable outcomes. In this paper, we formulate the problem of finding an efficient outcome as a generalized submodular flow problem on a ...
Keywords: competitive equilibrium, stability, submodular flow problems, trading networks, discrete convexity

6 published by ACM
June 2016 STOC '16: Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 3
Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 116,   Downloads (Overall): 116

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Walrasian equilibrium prices have a remarkable property: they allow each buyer to purchase a bundle of goods that she finds the most desirable, while guaranteeing that the induced allocation over all buyers will globally maximize social welfare. However, this clean story has two caveats. * First, the prices may induce ...
Keywords: Learning Theory, Walrasian Equilibrium

7
February 2016 Discrete Applied Mathematics: Volume 200 Issue C, February 2016
Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We generalize Chade and Smith's (2006) simultaneous search problem to a class of discrete optimization problems. More precisely, we study the problem of maximizing a weighted sum of utilities of objects minus the sum of costs of acquiring these objects, given the constraint that the sum of weights cannot exceed ...
Keywords: Selection, Greedy, Submodularity

8
December 2015 WINE 2015: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 9470
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent's value or opportunity cost for the item is their private information and preferences are quasi-linear. Trade between agents employs a double oral auction DOA in which both buyers and ...

9 published by ACM
June 2015 EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 22,   Downloads (Overall): 139

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The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a stable matching. The nearby ...
Keywords: complementarities, stable matching

10
November 2013 Mathematics of Operations Research: Volume 38 Issue 4, November 2013
Publisher: INFORMS
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

A monopolist seller has multiple units of an indivisible good to sell over a discrete, finite time horizon. Buyers with unit demand arrive over time and each buyer privately knows her arrival time, her value for a unit, and her deadline. We study whether the seller's optimal allocation rule is ...
Keywords: dynamic stochastic knapsack, dynamic auctions, optimal auctions, virtual valuation

11
January 2013 Operations Research: Volume 61 Issue 1, 01-02 2013
Publisher: INFORMS
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

We examine the problem of allocating an item repeatedly over time amongst a set of agents. The value that each agent derives from consumption of the item may vary over time. Furthermore, it is private information to the agent, and prior to consumption it may be unknown to that agent. ...
Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, click fraud, cost-per-action, pay-per-action, sponsored search, online advertising, prior-free mechanisms

12 published by ACM
October 2012 ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review: Volume 40 Issue 2, September 2012
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 4,   Downloads (12 Months): 19,   Downloads (Overall): 190

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13
August 2012 Mathematical Programming: Series A and B - Special Issue on ISMP 2012: Volume 134 Issue 1, August 2012
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 4

Mechanism design is about optimizing the allocation of resources when the parameters needed to determine an optimal allocation are privately held by the agents who will consume the resources. An agent’s report of her information will influence the resulting allocation which in turn will affect her utility. In such a ...
Keywords: 91

14
August 2012 Mathematical Programming: Series A and B: Volume 134 Issue 1, August 2012
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

Mechanism design is about optimizing the allocation of resources when the parameters needed to determine an optimal allocation are privately held by the agents who will consume the resources. An agent's report of her information will influence the resulting allocation which in turn will affect her utility. In such a ...
Keywords: 90, 91

15
March 2011 Operations Research: Volume 59 Issue 2, March 2011
Publisher: INFORMS
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 13

Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid. It extends easily to polymatroids. Applications include ...
Keywords: combinatorial, multi-item, Vickrey, matroid, polymatroid, auction

16
November 2010 IEEE Communications Magazine: Volume 48 Issue 11, November 2010
Publisher: IEEE Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 7

It is widely recognized that the centralized approach to spectrum management currently used in most countries has led to highly inefficient allocations. It is also recognized that more efficient allocations could be achieved through spectrum markets; however, most discussions have so far focused on secondary markets, which are managed by ...

17
September 2009 Allerton'09: Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
Publisher: IEEE Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

It is widely recognized that current policies for allocating wireless spectrum have led to inefficiencies and underutilization. One proposed solution to this is to enable" spectrum markets", which allow for entities to sell and/or lease spectrum dynamically over time. In this paper we consider the design of such a market ...

18
May 2009 GameNets'09: Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Publisher: IEEE Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 4

In previous work we have studied the use of sequential second price auctions for sharing a wireless resource, such as bandwidth or power. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource. It is well known that ...

19 published by ACM
November 2008 ACM SIGecom Exchanges: Volume 7 Issue 3, November 2008
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0,   Downloads (12 Months): 7,   Downloads (Overall): 87

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Consider a weather forecaster predicting the probability of rain for the next day. We consider tests that given a finite sequence of forecast predictions and outcomes will either pass or fail the forecaster. It is known that any test which passes a forecaster who knows the distribution of nature can ...
Keywords: bounded rationality, forecast testing, prediction

20
September 2008 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications: Volume 26 Issue 7, September 2008
Publisher: IEEE Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 17

We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second ...
Keywords: dynamic spectrum sharing, mechanism design, efficiency, resource allocation, auction, equilibrium



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