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 Markus M Mobius

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Bibliometrics: publication history
Average citations per article7.67
Citation Count23
Publication count3
Publication years2010-2017
Available for download2
Average downloads per article304.50
Downloads (cumulative)609
Downloads (12 Months)212
Downloads (6 Weeks)17
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1 published by ACM
November 2017 CIKM '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Conference on Information and Knowledge Management
Publisher: ACM
Citation Count: 1
Downloads (6 Weeks): 17,   Downloads (12 Months): 206,   Downloads (Overall): 393

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We present an analysis of traffic to websites known for publishing fake news in the months preceding the 2016 US presidential election. The study is based on the combined instrumentation data from two popular desktop web browsers: Internet Explorer 11 and Edge. We find that social media was the primary ...
Keywords: browsing data, elections, fake news, social media

December 2014 Management Science: Volume 60 Issue 12, December 2014
Publisher: INFORMS
Citation Count: 2

Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders ...
Keywords: advertisement exchange, online advertising, optimal auctions, real-time bidding

3 published by ACM
March 2011 WWW '11: Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Publisher: ACM
Citation Count: 5
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0,   Downloads (12 Months): 6,   Downloads (Overall): 216

Full text available: PDFPDF
We present a simple auction mechanism which extends the second-price auction with reserve and is truthful in expectation. This mechanism is particularly effective in private value environments where the distribution of valuations are irregular. Bidders can "buy-it-now", or alternatively "take-a-chance" where the top d bidders are equally likely to win. ...
Keywords: mechanism design, online advertising, sequential screening, ad auctions, adecn

March 2010 INFOCOM'10: Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Publisher: IEEE Press
Citation Count: 13

The success of future P2P applications ultimately depends on whether users will contribute their bandwidth, CPU and storage resources to a larger community. In this paper, we propose a new incentive paradigm, Networked Asynchronous Bilateral Trading (NABT), which can be applied to a broad range of P2P applications. In NABT, ...

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