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 Bart De Keijzer

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Average citations per article4.30
Citation Count43
Publication count10
Publication years2010-2017
Available for download4
Average downloads per article95.75
Downloads (cumulative)383
Downloads (12 Months)146
Downloads (6 Weeks)25
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11 results found Export Results: bibtexendnoteacmrefcsv

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1 published by ACM
December 2017 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on Wine'15: Volume 5 Issue 4, December 2017
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 6,   Downloads (12 Months): 6,   Downloads (Overall): 6

Full text available: PDFPDF
We study the revenue performance of sequential posted-price mechanisms and some natural extensions for a setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted-price mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to each buyer. We apply sequential posted-price mechanisms ...
Keywords: Mechanism design, posted pricing, approximation, correlated values, interdependence

2 published by ACM
June 2017 EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 11,   Downloads (12 Months): 72,   Downloads (Overall): 72

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We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the ...
Keywords: market intermediation, approximation algorithms, auctions, mechanism design, pricing, two-sided markets

3
January 2016 SODA '16: Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2
Downloads (6 Weeks): 6,   Downloads (12 Months): 52,   Downloads (Overall): 107

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Mechanism design for one-sided markets is an area of extensive research in economics and, since more than a decade, in computer science as well. Two-sided markets, on the other hand, have not received the same attention despite the numerous applications to web advertisement, stock exchange, and frequency spectrum allocation. This ...

4
August 2015 Theory of Computing Systems: Volume 57 Issue 2, August 2015
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We study the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes in Bottleneck Congestion games. These games model situations in which strategic players compete for a limited number of facilities. Each player allocates his weight to a (feasible) subset of the facilities with the goal to minimize the maximum (weight-dependent) latency that he experiences ...
Keywords: Algorithmic game theory, Price of anarchy, Congestion games, Inefficiency of equilibria, Strong equilibria

5
May 2014 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research: Volume 50 Issue 1, May 2014
Publisher: AI Access Foundation
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

In many circumstances where multiple agents need to make a joint decision, voting is used to aggregate the agents' preferences. Each agent's vote carries a weight, and if the sum of the weights of the agents in favor of some outcome is larger than or equal to a given quota, ...

6
September 2012 ESA'12: Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0

We consider a variant of congestion games where every player i expresses for each resource e and player j a positive externality , i.e., a value for being on e together with player j . Rather than adopting a game-theoretic perspective, we take an optimization point of view and consider ...

7
July 2012 AAAI'12: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

The (Shapley-Scarf) housing market is a well-studied and fundamental model of an exchange economy. Each agent owns a single house and the goal is to reallocate the houses to the agents in a mutually beneficial and stable manner. Recently, Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2011) independently examined ...

8
December 2011 WINE'11: Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 12

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player <em>i</em> 's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1−<em>α</em> <em>i</em> times his direct cost and <em>α</em> <em>i</em> times the social cost. Tuning the parameters <em>α</em> ...

9
May 2011 AAMAS '11: The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 15
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 12,   Downloads (Overall): 126

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We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem for all coalitional games provided that player types ...
Keywords: coalition formation, computational complexity, teamwork, coordination, game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative)

10
October 2010 SAGT'10: Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 3

We study the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes in bottleneck congestion games. These games model situations in which strategic players compete for a limited number of facilities. Each player allocates his weight to a (feasible) subset of the facilities with the goal to minimize the maximum (weight-dependent) latency that he experiences ...

11
May 2010 AAMAS '10: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 6
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 5,   Downloads (Overall): 70

Full text available: PdfPdf
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while not every agent is supposed to have an equal amount of influence in the outcome of such a decision. Weighted voting games are often used to deal with these situations. The amount of influence that an ...
Keywords: power index, simple games, weighted voting games



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