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 Yiannis Giannakopoulos

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Average citations per article3.75
Citation Count30
Publication count8
Publication years2011-2017
Available for download2
Average downloads per article79.00
Downloads (cumulative)158
Downloads (12 Months)41
Downloads (6 Weeks)23
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8 results found Export Results: bibtexendnoteacmrefcsv

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1 published by ACM
December 2017 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on Wine'15: Volume 5 Issue 4, December 2017
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 20,   Downloads (12 Months): 20,   Downloads (Overall): 20

Full text available: PDFPDF
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, in which the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically allocates each task to its best machine, achieves an approximation ratio ...
Keywords: balls-in-bins, Bayesian mechanism design, Scheduling, VCG mechanism

2
December 2015 WINE 2015: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 9470
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically allocates each task to its best machine, achieves an approximation ratio of ...

3
July 2015 ICALP 2015: Proceedings, Part II, of the 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume 9135
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 4

We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's valuations for the items come from independent but not necessarily identical distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rules of the﾿optimal selling mechanism. As a ...

4
May 2015 Theoretical Computer Science: Volume 581 Issue C, May 2015
Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers Ltd.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d.�from a uniform distribution and in the case where they follow independent (but not necessarily identical) exponential distributions. ...
Keywords: Duality, Mechanism design, Revenue maximization, Optimal auctions

5
January 2015 Theoretical Computer Science: Volume 562 Issue C, January 2015
Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers Ltd.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1

We study the classic frequent items problem in data streams, but from a competitive analysis point of view. We consider the standard worst-case input model, as well as a weaker distributional adversarial setting. We are primarily interested in the single-slot memory case and for both models we give (asymptotically) tight ...
Keywords: Competitive analysis, Frequent items, Data streams, Online algorithms

6 published by ACM
June 2014 EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 14
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 21,   Downloads (Overall): 138

Full text available: PDFPDF
We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder multi-item auctions for uniform i.i.d. valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; previous results were only known for up to three items. To do so, we develop a general duality framework for the general ...
Keywords: duality, optimal auctions, mechanism design, revenue maximization

7
July 2012 SWAT'12: Proceedings of the 13th Scandinavian conference on Algorithm Theory
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

We study the well-known frequent items problem in data streams from a competitive analysis point of view. We consider the standard worst-case input model, as well as a weaker distributional adversarial setting. We are primarily interested in the single-slot memory case and for both models we give (asymptotically) tight bounds ...

8
February 2011 Computer Science Review: Volume 5 Issue 1, February, 2011
Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2

In emerging pervasive scenarios, data is collected by sensing devices in streams that occur at several distributed points of observation. The size of the data typically far exceeds the storage and computational capabilities of the tiny devices that have to collect and process them. A general and challenging task is ...
Keywords: Data streams, Aggregation, Database management, Sensor networks



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