Johnny 2: a user test of key continuity management with S/MIME and Outlook Express

ABSTRACT

Secure email has struggled with signifcant obstacles to adoption, among them the low usability of encryption software and the cost and overhead of obtaining public key certificates. Key continuity management (KCM) has been proposed as a way to lower these barriers to adoption, by making key generation, key management, and message signing essentially automatic. We present the first user study of KCM-secured email, conducted on naïve users who had no previous experience with secure email. Our secure email prototype, CoPilot, color-codes messages depending on whether they were signed and whether the signer was previously known or unknown. This interface makes users signicantly less susceptible to social engineering attacks overall, but new-identity attacks (from email addresses never seen before) are still effective. Also, naïve users do use the Sign and Encrypt button on the Outlook Express toolbar when the situation seems to warrant it, even without explicit instruction, although some falsely hoped that Encrypt would protect a secret message even when sent directly to an attacker. We conclude that KCM is a workable model for improving email security today, but work is needed to alert users to "phishing" attacks.

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Index Terms

• Human-centered computing

  • Human computer interaction (HCI)

• Security and privacy

  • Systems security

    • Operating systems security