Abstract
Reputation in online economic systems is typically quantified using counters that specify positive and negative feedback from past transactions and/or some form of transaction network analysis that aims to quantify the likelihood that a network user will commit a fraudulent transaction. These approaches can be deceiving to honest users from numerous perspectives. We take a radically different approach with the goal of guaranteeing to a buyer that a fraudulent seller cannot disappear from the system with profit following a set of fabricated transactions that total a certain monetary limit. Even in the case of stolen identity, such an adversary cannot produce illegal profit unless a buyer decides to pay over the suggested limit.
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Index Terms
Relating Reputation and Money in Online Markets
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