research-article

Return-oriented programming without returns

Authors:

Stephen Checkoway,

Alexandra Dmitrienko,

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,

Marcel WinandyAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '10: Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

Pages 559 - 572

https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866370

Published: 04 October 2010 Publication History

Abstract

We show that on both the x86 and ARM architectures it is possible to mount return-oriented programming attacks without using return instructions. Our attacks instead make use of certain instruction sequences that behave like a return, which occur with sufficient frequency in large libraries on (x86) Linux and (ARM) Android to allow creation of Turing-complete gadget sets.

Because they do not make use of return instructions, our new attacks have negative implications for several recently proposed classes of defense against return-oriented programming: those that detect the too-frequent use of returns in the instruction stream; those that detect violations of the last-in, first-out invariant normally maintained for the return-address stack; and those that modify compilers to produce code that avoids the return instruction.

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Index Terms

Return-oriented programming without returns
1. Security and privacy
  1. Systems security
    1. Operating systems security

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '10: Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

October 2010

782 pages

ISBN:9781450302456

DOI:10.1145/1866307

General Chair:
Ehab Al-Shaer
University of North Carolina, Charlotte, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Angelos D. Keromytis
Columbia University, USA
,
Vitaly Shmatikov
University of Texas at Austin, USA

Copyright © 2010 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 04 October 2010

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CCS '10: 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2010

October 4 - 8, 2010

Illinois, Chicago, USA

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CCS '10 Paper Acceptance Rate 55 of 325 submissions, 17%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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https://doi.org/10.23919/SpliTech61897.2024.10612517
CHEN CWAN HZHAO X(2024)Log refusion: adversarial attacks against the integrity of application logs and defense methodsSCIENTIA SINICA Informationis10.1360/SSI-2024-004254:9(2157)Online publication date: 10-Sep-2024
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https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670413
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