Abstract
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function that guarantees that the players cannot improve their utilities by cheating. Mechanism design approaches are particularly appealing for designing protocols that cannot be manipulated by rational players.
We present new constructions of so-called mechanisms with verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [2001]. We first show how to obtain mechanisms that, for single-parameter domains, are resistant to coalitions of colluding agents even if they can exchange compensations. Based on this result we derive a class of exact truthful mechanisms with verification for arbitrary bounded domains. This class of problems includes most of the problems studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature and for which exact solutions cannot be obtained with truthful mechanisms without verification. This result is an improvement over all known previous constructions of exact mechanisms with verification.
- Andelman, N., Azar, Y., and Sorani, M. 2005. Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Theoritical Aspects of Computer Science STACS. 69--82. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Archer, A. and Tardos, É. 2001. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). 482--491. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G., and Ventre, C. 2006. New constructions of mechanisms with verification. In Proceedings of the International Colloquium of Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP). 596--607. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., and Persiano, G. 2009. The power of verification for one-parameter agents. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 75, 3, 190--211. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Briest, P., Krysta, P., and Vöcking, B. 2005. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). 39--48. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E., and Vidali, A. 2007. A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithm (SODA). 1163--1170. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Clarke, E. H. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 17--33.Google Scholar
- Elkind, E., Sahai, A., and Steiglitz, K. 2004. Frugality in path auctions. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA). 701--709. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Gamzu, I. 2007. Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness. In Proceedings of the Wrokshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA). Vol. 4927. 15--26. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Goldberg, A. V. and Hartline, J. D. 2005. Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA). 620--629. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Groves, T. 1973. Incentive in teams. Econometrica 41, 617--631.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Koutsoupias, E. and Papadimitriou, C. H. 1999. Worst-case equilibria. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS). 404--413. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Koutsoupias, E. and Vidali, A. 2007. A lower bound of 1 + φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS). 454--464. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Lavi, R. and Swamy, C. 2007. Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC). 252--261. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Levin, H., Schapira, M., and Zohar, A. 2008. Interdomain routing and games. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). 57--66. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Mu’alem, A. and Schapira, M. 2007. Setting lower bounds on truthfulness. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA). 1143--1152. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Nisan, N. and Ronen, A. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 35, 166--196.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Nisan, N. and Ronen, A. 2007. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 29, 19--47. Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Nisan, N. and Segal, I. 2006. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices. J. Econ. Theory 129, 1, 192--224.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Papadimitriou, C. H. 2001. Algorithms, games, and the Internet. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). 749--753. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Penna, P. and Ventre, C. 2009. Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC). 147--156. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Proietti, G. and Widmayer, P. 2005. A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). 195--202. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Roberts, K. 1979. The characterization of implementable choice rules. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, J.-J. Laffont Ed., North-Holland, 321--348.Google Scholar
- Schummer, J. 2000. Manipulation through bribes. J. Econ. Theory 91, 3, 180--198.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Ventre, C. 2006. Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE). Vol. 4286. 37--49. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance, 8--37.Google Scholar
Index Terms
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
Recommendations
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
EC '09: Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerceWe present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to ...
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08: Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on AlgorithmsA truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that "players" cannot improve their utilities by "cheating". Mechanism design approaches are particularly appealing for designing "protocols" ...
Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions
Cooperation among bidders in traditional auctions is typically forbidden. This is because it is viewed as being harmful to the interests of sellers, who hope to obtain fair prices for their sale items. It also may be harmful to other bidders who are not ...






Comments