Abstract
Tor is one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near-real-time communications on the Internet. Borisov et al. [2007] proposed a denial-of-service-based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the probability of compromising the anonymity provided. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of the attack using both an analytic model and simulation. We also describe two algorithms for detecting such attacks, one deterministic and proved correct, the other probabilistic and verified in simulation.
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Index Terms
Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
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