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Efficient Control-Flow Subgraph Matching for Detecting Hardware Trojans in RTL Models

Published:27 September 2017Publication History
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Abstract

Only few solutions for Hardware Trojan (HT) detection work at Register-Transfer Level (RTL), thus delaying the identification of possible security issues at lower abstraction levels of the design process. In addition, the most of existing approaches work only for specific kinds of HTs. To overcome these limitations, we present a verification approach that detects different types of HTs in RTL models by exploiting an efficient control-flow subgraph matching algorithm. The prototypes of HTs that can be detected are modelled in a library by using Control-Flow Graphs (CFGs) that can be parametrised and extended to cover several variants of Trojan patterns. Experimental results show that our approach is effective and efficient in comparison with other state-of-the-art solutions.

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  1. Efficient Control-Flow Subgraph Matching for Detecting Hardware Trojans in RTL Models

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