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A Measure of Added Value in Groups

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Published:23 July 2019Publication History
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Abstract

The intuitive notion of added value in groups represents a fundamental property of biological, physical, and economic systems: how the interaction or cooperation of multiple entities, substances, or other agents can produce synergistic effects. However, despite the ubiquity of group formation, a well-founded measure of added value has remained elusive. Here, we propose such a measure inspired by the Shapley value—a fundamental solution concept from Cooperative Game Theory. To this end, we start by developing a solution concept that measures the average impact of each player in a coalitional game and show how this measure uniquely satisfies a set of intuitive properties. Then, building upon our solution concept, we propose a measure of added value that not only analyzes the interactions of players inside their group, but also outside it, thereby reflecting otherwise-hidden information about how these individuals typically perform in various groups of the population.

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        cover image ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems
        ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems  Volume 13, Issue 4
        December 2018
        143 pages
        ISSN:1556-4665
        EISSN:1556-4703
        DOI:10.1145/3349607
        Issue’s Table of Contents

        Copyright © 2019 ACM

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        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 23 July 2019
        • Accepted: 1 March 2019
        • Received: 1 August 2018
        Published in taas Volume 13, Issue 4

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