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Come as You Are: Helping Unmodified Clients Bypass Censorship with Server-side Evasion

Published:30 July 2020Publication History

ABSTRACT

Decades of work on censorship evasion have resulted in myriad ways to empower clients with the ability to access censored content, but to our knowledge all of them have required some degree of client-side participation. Having to download and run anti-censorship software can put users at risk, and does not help the many users who do not even realize they are being censored in the first place.

In this paper, we present the first purely server-side censorship evasion strategies---11 in total. We extend a recent tool, Geneva, to automate the discovery and implementation of server-side strategies, and we apply it to four countries (China, India, Iran, and Kazakhstan) and five protocols (DNS-over-TCP, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, and SMTP). We also perform follow-on experiments to understand why the strategies Geneva finds work, and to glean new insights into how censors operate. Among these, we find that China runs a completely separate network stack (each with its own unique bugs) for each application-layer protocol that it censors.

The server-side techniques we find are easier and safer to deploy than client-side strategies. Our code and data are publicly available.

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3387514.3405889.mp4

20-minute video presentation for "Come As You Are: Helping Unmodified Clients Bypass Censorship With Server-side Evasion".

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        SIGCOMM '20: Proceedings of the Annual conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication on the applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
        July 2020
        814 pages
        ISBN:9781450379557
        DOI:10.1145/3387514

        Copyright © 2020 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 30 July 2020

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