Abstract
Although the iterative double auction has been widely used in many different applications, one of the major problems in its current implementations is that they rely on a trusted third party to handle the auction process. This imposes the risk of single point of failures, monopoly, and bribery. In this article, we aim to tackle this problem by proposing a novel decentralized and trustless framework for iterative double auction based on blockchain. Our design adopts the smart contract and state channel technologies to enable a double auction process among parties that do not need to trust each other, while minimizing the blockchain transactions. In specific, we propose an extension to the original concept of state channels that can support multiparty computation. Then, we provide a formal development of the proposed framework and prove the security of our design against adversaries. Finally, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation of our framework using Elixir and Solidity, on which we conduct various experiments to demonstrate its feasibility and practicality.
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Index Terms
A Blockchain-based Iterative Double Auction Protocol Using Multiparty State Channels
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