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Towards detection of software supply chain attacks by forensic artifacts

Published:25 August 2020Publication History

ABSTRACT

Third-party dependencies may introduce security risks to the software supply chain and hence yield harm to their dependent software. There are many known cases of malicious open source packages posing risks to developers and end users. However, while efforts are made to detect vulnerable open source packages, malicious packages are not yet considered explicitly. In order to tackle this problem we perform an exploratory case study on previously occurred attacks on the software supply chain with respect to observable artifacts created. Based on gained insights, we propose Buildwatch, a framework for dynamic analysis of software and its third-party dependencies. We noticed that malicious packages introduce a significant amount of new artifacts during installation when compared to benign versions of the same package. The paper presents a first analysis of observable artifacts of malicious packages as well as a possible mitigation strategy that might lead to more insight in long term.

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          cover image ACM Other conferences
          ARES '20: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
          August 2020
          1073 pages
          ISBN:9781450388337
          DOI:10.1145/3407023
          • Program Chairs:
          • Melanie Volkamer,
          • Christian Wressnegger

          Copyright © 2020 ACM

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          Association for Computing Machinery

          New York, NY, United States

          Publication History

          • Published: 25 August 2020

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          Overall Acceptance Rate 228 of 451 submissions, 51%

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