skip to main content
research-article

NoiSense Print: Detecting Data Integrity Attacks on Sensor Measurements Using Hardware-based Fingerprints

Published:28 September 2020Publication History
Skip Abstract Section

Abstract

Fingerprinting of various physical and logical devices has been proposed for uniquely identifying users or devices of mainstream IT systems such as PCs, laptops, and smart phones. However, the application of such techniques in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is less explored for reasons such as a lack of direct access to such systems and the cost of faithfully reproducing realistic threat scenarios. This work addresses the feasibility of using fingerprinting techniques in the context of realistic ICS related to water treatment and distribution systems. A model-free sensor fingerprinting scheme (NoiSense) and a model-based sensor fingerprinting scheme (NoisePrint) are proposed. Using extensive experimentation with sensors, it is shown that noise patterns due to microscopic imperfections in hardware manufacturing can uniquely identify sensors with accuracy as high as 97%. The proposed technique can be used to detect physical attacks, such as the replacement of legitimate sensors by faulty or manipulated sensors. For NoisePrint, a combined fingerprint for sensor and process noise is created. The difference (called residual), between expected and observed values, i.e., noise, is used to derive a model of the system. It was found that in steady state the residual vector is a function of process and sensor noise. Data from experiments reveals that a multitude of sensors can be uniquely identified with a minimum accuracy of 90% based on NoisePrint. Also proposed is a novel challenge-response protocol that exposes more powerful cyber-attacks, including replay attacks.

References

  1. S. Adepu and A. Mathur. 2016. Generalized attacker and attack models for cyber physical systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE 40th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC’16), Vol. 1. 283--292. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/COMPSAC.2016.122Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  2. C. M. Ahmed, S. Adepu, and A. Mathur. 2016. Limitations of state estimation-based cyber attack detection schemes in industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the Smart City Security and Privacy Workshop (SCSP-W’16). 1--5. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SCSPW.2016.7509557Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  3. C. M. Ahmed and A. P. Mathur. 2017. Hardware identification via sensor fingerprinting in a cyber physical system. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C’17). 517--524. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/QRS-C.2017.89Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  4. Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Carlos Murguia, and Justin Ruths. 2017. Model-based attack detection scheme for smart water distribution networks. In Proceedings of the ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS’17). ACM, New York, NY, 101--113. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053011Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  5. Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Martin Ochoa, Jianying Zhou, Aditya Mathur, Rizwan Qadeer, Carlos Murguia, and Justin Ruths. 2018. NoisePrint: Attack detection using sensor and process noise fingerprint in cyber physical systems. In Proceedings of the ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS’18). ACM. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3196494.3196532Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  6. Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Venkata Reddy Palleti, and Aditya P. Mathur. 2017. WADI: A water distribution testbed for research in the design of secure cyber physical systems. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems for Smart Water Networks (CySWATER’17). ACM, New York, NY, 25--28. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3055366.3055375Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  7. Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Jianying Zhou, and Aditya P. Mathur. 2018. Noise matters: Using sensor and process noise fingerprint to detect stealthy cyber attacks and authenticate sensors in CPS. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’18). ACM, New York, NY, 566--581. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274748Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  8. Rajeev Alur. 2015. Principles of Cyber-physical Systems. MIT Press.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  9. S. Amin, X. Litrico, S. Sastry, and A. M. Bayen. 2013a. Cyber security of water SCADA systems-part I: Analysis and experimentation of stealthy deception attacks. IEEE Trans. Syst. Technol. (2013a), 1963--1970.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  10. S. Amin, X. Litrico, S. Sastry, and A. M. Bayen. 2013b. Cyber security of water SCADA systems-part II: Attack detection using enhanced hydrodynamic models. IEEE Trans. Syst. Technol. (2013b), 1679--1693.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  11. Ross Anderson and Markus Kuhn. 1996. Tamper resistance: A cautionary note. In Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WOEC’96). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1--1. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1267167.1267168.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  12. Arduino. 2016. Arduino. Retrieved from http://www.arduino.org/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  13. Karl J. Aström and Björn Wittenmark. 1997. Computer-controlled Systems (3rd ed.). Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  14. H. Bojinov, D. Boneh, Y. Michalevsky, and G. Nakibly. 2016. Mobile device identification via sensor fingerprinting. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1416.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  15. Vladimir Brik, Suman Banerjee, Marco Gruteser, and Sangho Oh. 2008. Wireless device identification with radiometric signatures. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom’08). ACM, New York, NY, 116--127. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/1409944.1409959Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  16. D. Buchla and W. McLachlan. 1992. Applied Electronic Instrumentation and Measurement. Merrill. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=7h9TAAAAMAAJ.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  17. Alvaro Cardenas, Saurabh Amin, Bruno Sinopoli, Annarita Giani, Adrian Perrig, and Shankar Sastry. 2009. Challenges for securing cyber physical systems. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Future Directions in Cyber-physical Systems Security. 5.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  18. ICS SANS. 2016. Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid. Retrieved from https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  19. Chih-Chung Chang and Chih-Jen Lin. 2011. LIBSVM: A library for support vector machines. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. 2, 3 (2011), 27:1–27:27. Retrieved from http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/cjlin/libsvm.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  20. CNN. 2007. Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  21. F. Coutard, E. Tisserand, and P. Schweitzer. 2005. The temperature influence on the piezoelectric transducer noise, measurements and modelling. In Proceedings of the IEEE Ultrasonics Symposium, Vol. 3. 1652--1655.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  22. Gyorgy Dan and Henrik Sandberg. 2010. Stealth attacks and protection schemes for state estimators in power systems. In Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm’10). IEEE, 214--219.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  23. Boris Danev, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, and Srdjan Čapkun. 2009. Physical-layer identification of RFID devices. In Proceedings of the 18th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium (SSYM’09). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 199--214. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1855768.1855781.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  24. A. Das and N. Borisov. 2014. Poster: Fingerprinting smartphones through speaker. In Proceedings of the IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  25. Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, and Matthew Caesar. 2015. Exploring ways to mitigate sensor-based smartphone fingerprinting. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.01874.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  26. S. Dey, N. Roy, W. Xu, R. R. Choudhury, and S. Nelakuditi. 2014. Accelprint: Imperfections of accelerometers make smartphones trackable. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’14).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  27. N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien. 2011. W32 Stuxnet Dossier. Symantec, version 1.4. Retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  28. Daniel B. Faria and David R. Cheriton. 2006. Detecting identity-based attacks in wireless networks using signalprints. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe’06). ACM, New York, NY, 43--52. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/1161289.1161298Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  29. Flotech. 2016. Electromagnetic Flowmeter. Retrieved from http://www.unhas.ac.id/rhiza/arsip/iwormee2009/old-archieve/Spec%20FIT.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  30. Flotech. 2016. RD700 2-Wire RADAR Level Transmitter. Retrieved from http://www.flotech.com.sg/downloads/rd700-radar-level-transmitter.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  31. David Formby, Preethi Srinivasan, Andrew Leonard, Jonathan Rogers, and Raheem Beyah. 2016. Who’s in control of your control system? Device fingerprinting for cyber-physical systems. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’16).Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  32. Luis Garcia, Ferdinand Brasser, Mehmet H. Cintuglu, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Osama Mohammed, and Saman A. Zonouz. 2017. Hey, my malware knows physics! Attacking PLCs with physical model aware rootkit. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’17).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  33. Ryan M. Gerdes, Thomas E. Daniels, Mani Mina, and Steve F. Russell. 2006. Device identification via analog signal fingerprinting: A matched filter approach. In Proceedings of the Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’17).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  34. Dieter Gollmann and Marina Krotofil. 2016. Cyber-Physical Systems Security. Springer, Berlin, 195--204. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49301-4_14Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  35. Naman Govil, Anand Agrawal, and Nils Ole Tippenhauer. 2017. On ladder logic bombs in industrial control systems. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05241.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  36. J. Hall, M. Barbeau, and E. Kranakis. 2005. Radio frequency fingerprinting for intrusion detection in wirless networks. In Proceedings of the Conference on Defendable and Secure Computing.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  37. A. Humayed, J. Lin, F. Li, and B. Luo. 2017. Cyber-physical systems security—A survey. IEEE Internet Things J. 4, 6 (2017), 1802--1831. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2017.2703172Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  38. Indumart. 2012. Accuracy of the RADAR measurements. Retrieved from http://www.indumart.com/Level-measurement-3.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  39. T. Kohno, A. Broido, and K. C. Claffy. 2005. Remote physical device fingerprinting. IEEE Trans. Depend. Secure Comput. 2, 2 (Apr. 2005), 93--108. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2005.26Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  40. D. F. Kune, J. Backes, S. S. Clark, D. Kramer, M. Reynolds, K. Fu, Y. Kim, and W. Xu. 2013. Ghost talk: Mitigating EMI signal injection attacks against analog sensors. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 145--159. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2013.20Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  41. E. A. Lee. 2008. Cyber physical systems: Design challenges. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Symposium on Object and Component-Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing (ISORC’08). 363--369. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ISORC.2008.25Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  42. David Lincoln. 2006. An Investigation into an Electromagnetic Flowmeter for Use with Low Conductivity Liquids. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Wales, Cardiff.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  43. Bela G. Liptak. 2003. Instrument Engineer’s Handbook (4 ed.). Vol. 1. CRC Press.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  44. J. Lukas, J. Fridrich, and M. Goljan. 2006. Digital camera identification from sensor pattern noise. IEEE Trans. Info. Forens. Secur. 1, 2 (2006).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  45. A. P. Mathur and N. O. Tippenhauer. 2016. SWaT: A water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS security. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Cyber-physical Systems for Smart Water Networks (CySWater’16). 31--36. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/CySWater.2016.7469060Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  46. S. McLaughlin, C. Konstantinou, X. Wang, L. Davi, A. R. Sadeghi, M. Maniatakos, and R. Karri. 2016. The cybersecurity landscape in industrial control systems. Proc. IEEE 104, 5 (May 2016), 1039--1057. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2015.2512235Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  47. Stephen McLaughlin, Dmitry Podkuiko, and Patrick McDaniel. 2010. Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. Springer, Berlin, 176--187. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14379-3_15Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  48. Robert Mitchell and Ing-Ray Chen. 2014. A survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyber-physical systems. ACM Comput. Surv. 46, 4, Article 55 (Mar. 2014), 29 pages. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2542049Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  49. Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli. 2009. Secure control against replay attacks. In Proceedings of the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton’09). 911--918. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394956Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  50. Yilin Mo and Bruno Sinopoli. 2012. Integrity attacks on cyber-physical systems. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS’12). ACM, New York, NY, 47--54. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2185505.2185514Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  51. Y. Mo, S. Weerakkody, and B. Sinopoli. 2015. Physical authentication of control systems: Designing watermarked control inputs to detect counterfeit sensor outputs. IEEE Control Syst. 35, 1 (Feb. 2015), 93--109. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MCS.2014.2364724Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  52. S. B. Moon, P. Skelly, and D. Towsley. 1999. Estimation and removal of clock skew from network delay measurements. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (INFOCOM’99), Vol. 1. IEEE, 227–234. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.1999.749287Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  53. Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed and Jianying Zhou. 2020. Challenges and opportunities in CPS security: A physics-based perspective. IEEE Secur. Privacy (2020). arXiv:cs.CR/2004.03178Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  54. C. Mujeeb Ahmed, A. Mathur, and M. Ochoa. 2017. NoiSense: Detecting data integrity attacks on sensor measurements using hardware-based fingerprints. ArXiv e-prints (Dec. 2017). arXiv:cs.CR/1712.01598Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  55. C. Murguia and J. Ruths. 2016. Characterization of a CUSUM model-based sensor attack detector. In Proceedings of the IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC’16). 1303--1309. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798446Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  56. B. Nick, K. Nathan, C. Bojan, and R. Arun. 2009. Identifying sensors from fingerprint images. In Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops. 78--84.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  57. NIST. 2014. Cyber-Physical Systems. Retrieved from https://www.nist.gov/el/cyber-physical-systems.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  58. P. Van Overschee and B. De Moor. 1996. Subspace Identification for Linear Systems: Theory, Implementation, Applications. Kluwer Academic Publications, Boston.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  59. Venkata Reddy Palleti, Vishrut Kumar Mishra, Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, and Aditya Mathur. 2020. Can replay attacks designed to steal water from water distribution systems remain undetected? ACM Trans. Cyber-Phys. Syst. (June 2020). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3406764Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  60. Youngseok Park, Yunmok Son, Hocheol Shin, Dohyun Kim, and Yongdae Kim. 2016. This ain’t your dose: Sensor spoofing attack on medical infusion pump. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT’16). USENIX Association, Austin, TX. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot16/workshop-program/presentation/park.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  61. Neal Patwari and Sneha K. Kasera. 2007. Robust location distinction using temporal link signatures. In Proceedings of the 13th Annual ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom’07). ACM, New York, NY, 111--122. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/1287853.1287867Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  62. Vern Paxson. 1998. On calibrating measurements of packet transit times. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS Joint International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS’98/PERFORMANCE’98). ACM, New York, NY, 11--21. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/277851.277865Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  63. S. Petr, M. Jiri, and S. Josef. 2011. Noise in piezoelectric ceramics at the low temperature. In Radio Engineering, Vol. 20.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  64. J. Prakash and C. M. Ahmed. 2017. Can you see me on performance of wireless fingerprinting in a cyber physical system. In Proceedings of the IEEE 18th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE’17). 163--170. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/HASE.2017.40Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  65. D. Quarta, M. Pogliani, M. Polino, F. Maggi, A. M. Zanchettin, and S. Zanero. 2017. An experimental security analysis of an industrial robot controller. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP’17). 268--286. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.20Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  66. Rizwan Qadeer, Carlos Murguia, Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, and Justin Ruths. 2017. Multistage downstream attack detection in a cyber physical system. In Proceedings of the CyberICPS Workshop in Conjunction with ESORICS.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  67. S. V. Radhakrishnan, A. S. Uluagac, and R. Beyah. 2015. GTID: A technique for physical device and device type fingerprinting. IEEE Trans. Depend. Secure Comput. 12, 5 (Sept. 2015), 519--532. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2014.2369033Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  68. K. A. Remley, C. A. Grosvenor, R. T. Johnk, D. R. Novotny, P. D. Hale, M. D. McKinley, A. Karygiannis, and E. Antonakakis. 2005. Electromagnetic signatures of WLAN cards and network security. In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE International Symposium on Signal Processing and Information Technology. 484--488. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSPIT.2005.1577145Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  69. Marco Rocchetto and Nils Ole Tippenhauer. 2016. CPDY: Extending the dolev-yao attacker with physical-layer interactions. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02562.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  70. Hocheol Shin, Yunmok Son, Youngseok Park, Yujin Kwon, and Yongdae Kim. 2016. Sampling race: Bypassing timing-based analog active sensor spoofing detection on analog-digital systems. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Offensive Technologies (WOOT’16). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 200--210. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3027019.3027037.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  71. Yasser Shoukry, Paul Martin, Yair Yona, Suhas Diggavi, and Mani Srivastava. 2015. PyCRA: Physical challenge-response authentication for active sensors under spoofing attacks. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’15). ACM, New York, NY, 1004--1015. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813679Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  72. Sergei Petrovich Skorobogatov. 2005. Semi-invasive attacks: a new approach to hardware security analysis. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Cambridge.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  73. J. Slay and M. Miller. 2008. Lessons Learned from the Maroochy Water Breach. Springer, Boston, MA, 73--82.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  74. Yunmok Son, Hocheol Shin, Dongkwan Kim, Youngseok Park, Juhwan Noh, Kibum Choi, Jungwoo Choi, and Yongdae Kim. 2015. Rocking drones with intentional sound noise on gyroscopic sensors. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC’15). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 881--896. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2831143.2831199.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  75. S. Sridhar, A. Hahn, and M. Govindarasu. 2012. Cyber physical system security for the electric power grid. Proc. IEEE 100, 1 (Jan. 2012), 210--224. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2011.2165269Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  76. T. Jenny, T. Edin, N. Romesh, and A. Muhammad. 2013. Ultrasonic Fluid Quantity Measurement in Dynamic Vehicular Applications: A Support Vector Machine Approach. Springer.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  77. David I. Urbina, Jairo A. Giraldo, Alvaro A. Cardenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Junia Valente, Mustafa Faisal, Justin Ruths, Richard Candell, and Henrik Sandberg. 2016. Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 1092--1105.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  78. F. Ustuner, E. Aydemir, E. Güleç, M. Ilarslan, M. Celebi, and E. Demirel. 2014. Antenna radiation pattern measurement using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). In Proceedings of the 31st URSI General Assembly and Scientific Symposium (URSI GASS’14). 1--4. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/URSIGASS.2014.6929024Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  79. Peter Welch. 1967. The use of fast fourier transform for the estimation of power spectra: A method based on time averaging over short, modified periodograms. IEEE Trans. Audio Electroacoust. 15, 2 (1967), 70--73.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  80. Wired. 2015. A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage for the Second Time Ever. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  81. S. Yasser, M. Paul, T. Paulo, and S. Mani. 2013. Non-invasive spoofing attacks for anti-lock braking systems. In Proceedings of the Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES’13), Springer Link, Vol. 8086. 55--72.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar

Index Terms

  1. NoiSense Print: Detecting Data Integrity Attacks on Sensor Measurements Using Hardware-based Fingerprints

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Login options

    Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

    Sign in

    Full Access

    PDF Format

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    HTML Format

    View this article in HTML Format .

    View HTML Format
    About Cookies On This Site

    We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website.

    Learn more

    Got it!