Abstract
At present, clients can outsource lots of complex and abundant computation, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), tasks to clouds by the “pay as you go” model. Outsourcing computation can save costs for clients and fully utilize the existing cloud infrastructures. However, it is hard for clients to trust the clouds even if blockchain is used as the trusted platform. In this article, we utilize the verification method as [email protected] by only two rational clouds, who hope to maximize their utilities. Utilities are defined as the incomes of clouds when they provide computation results to clients. More specifically, one client outsources two jobs to two clouds and each job contains n tasks, which include k identical sentinels. Two clouds can either honestly compute each task or collude on the identical sentinel tasks by agreeing on random values. If the results of identical sentinels are identical, then client regards the jobs as correctly computed without verification. Obviously, rational clouds have incentives to deviate by collusion and provide identical random results for a higher income. We discuss how to prevent collusion by using deposits, e.g., bit-coins. Furthermore, utilities for each cloud can be automatically assigned by a smart contract. We prove that, given proper parameters, two rational clouds will honestly send correct results to the client without collusion.
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Index Terms
Collusion-free for Cloud Verification toward the View of Game Theory
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