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Collusion-free for Cloud Verification toward the View of Game Theory

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Published:11 November 2021Publication History
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Abstract

At present, clients can outsource lots of complex and abundant computation, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), tasks to clouds by the “pay as you go” model. Outsourcing computation can save costs for clients and fully utilize the existing cloud infrastructures. However, it is hard for clients to trust the clouds even if blockchain is used as the trusted platform. In this article, we utilize the verification method as [email protected] by only two rational clouds, who hope to maximize their utilities. Utilities are defined as the incomes of clouds when they provide computation results to clients. More specifically, one client outsources two jobs to two clouds and each job contains n tasks, which include k identical sentinels. Two clouds can either honestly compute each task or collude on the identical sentinel tasks by agreeing on random values. If the results of identical sentinels are identical, then client regards the jobs as correctly computed without verification. Obviously, rational clouds have incentives to deviate by collusion and provide identical random results for a higher income. We discuss how to prevent collusion by using deposits, e.g., bit-coins. Furthermore, utilities for each cloud can be automatically assigned by a smart contract. We prove that, given proper parameters, two rational clouds will honestly send correct results to the client without collusion.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
      ACM Transactions on Internet Technology  Volume 22, Issue 2
      May 2022
      582 pages
      ISSN:1533-5399
      EISSN:1557-6051
      DOI:10.1145/3490674
      • Editor:
      • Ling Liu
      Issue’s Table of Contents

      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      • Published: 11 November 2021
      • Accepted: 1 September 2020
      • Revised: 1 July 2020
      • Received: 1 June 2020
      Published in toit Volume 22, Issue 2

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