Abstract
We investigate the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners in elections over incomplete voter preferences. In the case of the necessary winners, we show how to implement and accelerate the polynomial-time algorithm of Xia and Conitzer. In the case of the possible winners, where the problem is NP-hard, we give a natural reduction to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for all positional scoring rules and implement it in a leading commercial optimization solver. Further, we devise optimization techniques to minimize the number of ILP executions and, oftentimes, avoid them altogether. We conduct a thorough experimental study that includes the construction of a rich benchmark of election data based on real and synthetic data. Our findings suggest that, the worst-case intractability of the possible winners notwithstanding, the algorithmic techniques presented here scale well and can be used to compute the possible winners in realistic scenarios.
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Index Terms
Algorithmic Techniques for Necessary and Possible Winners
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