skip to main content
10.1145/3487552.3487816acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesimcConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article
Open access

Risky BIZness: risks derived from registrar name management

Published: 02 November 2021 Publication History
  • Get Citation Alerts
  • Abstract

    In this paper, we explore a domain hijacking risk that is an accidental byproduct of undocumented operational practices between domain registrars and registries. We show how over the last nine years over 512K domains have been implicitly exposed to the risk of hijacking, affecting names in most popular TLDs (including .com and .net) as well as legacy TLDs with tight registration control (such as .edu and .gov). Moreover, we show that this weakness has been actively exploited by multiple parties who, over the years, have assumed control over 163K domains without having any ownership interest in those names. In addition to characterizing the nature and size of this problem, we also report on the efficacy of the remediation in response to our outreach with registrars.

    References

    [1]
    J. Abley, B. Dickson, W. Kumari, and G. Michaelson. 2015. AS112 Redirection Using DNAME. RFC 7535. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7535.txt.
    [2]
    Gautam Akiwate, Mattijs Jonker, Raffaele Sommese, Ian Foster, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Stefan Savage, and KC Claffy. 2020. Unresolved Issues: Prevalence, Persistence, and Perils of Lame Delegations. In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). Virtual Event.
    [3]
    Eihal Alowaisheq, Siyuan Tang, Zhihao Wang, Fatemah Alharbi, Xiaojing Liao, and XiaoFeng Wang. 2020. Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting Referral. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). Virtual Event.
    [4]
    Matthew Bryant. 2017. The .io Error - Taking Control of All .io Domains With a Targeted Registration - The Hacker Blog. https://thehackerblog.com/the-io-error-taking-control-of-all-io-domains-with-a-targeted-registration/.
    [5]
    CAIDA and Ian Foster. 2020. CAIDA-DNS Zone Database (DZDB). https://dzdb.caida.org.
    [6]
    David Dagon. 2008. DNS Poisoning: Developments, Attacks and Research Directions. USENIX Security 2008, DNS Panel Talk. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec08/tech/slides/dagon_slides.pdf.
    [7]
    Department of Homeland Security. 2019. Emergency Directive 19-01: Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering. https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/.
    [8]
    DomainTools. 2020. Whois History. https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/.
    [9]
    D. Eastlake and A. Panitz. 1999. Reserved Top Level DNS Names. RFC 2606. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2606.txt.
    [10]
    Let's Encrypt. 2020. Challenge Types - DNS-01 Challenge. https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/.
    [11]
    S. Hollenbeck. 2009. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP). RFC 5730. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5730.txt.
    [12]
    S. Hollenbeck. 2009. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping. RFC 5731. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5731.txt.
    [13]
    S. Hollenbeck. 2009. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Host Mapping. RFC 5732. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5732.txt.
    [14]
    ICANN. 2020. Centralized Zone Data Service. https://czds.icann.org.
    [15]
    Krebs on Security. 2019. A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/.
    [16]
    Daiping Liu, Shuai Hao, and Haining Wang. 2016. All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS Records. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, Vienna, Austria, 1414--1425.
    [17]
    P. Mockapetris. 1987. Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities. RFC 1034. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt.
    [18]
    P. Mockapetris. 1987. Domain Names - Implementation and Specification. RFC 1035. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt.
    [19]
    S. Cheshire and M. Krochmal. 2013. Special-Use Domain Names. RFC 6761. https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6761.txt.
    [20]
    Sooel Son and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2010. The Hitchhiker's Guide to DNS Cache Poisoning. In Proceedings of the 6th International ICST Conference (SecureComm). Singapore, 466--483.
    [21]
    Thomas Vissers, Timothy Barron, Tom Van Goethem, Wouter Joosen, and Nick Nikiforakis. 2017. The Wolf of Name Street: Hijacking Domains Through Their Nameservers. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, Dallas, TX, 957--970.

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2023)Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling DomainsProceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems10.1145/35794407:1(1-28)Online publication date: 2-Mar-2023
    • (2022)Retroactive identification of targeted DNS infrastructure hijackingProceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference10.1145/3517745.3561425(14-32)Online publication date: 25-Oct-2022

    Index Terms

    1. Risky BIZness: risks derived from registrar name management

        Recommendations

        Comments

        Information & Contributors

        Information

        Published In

        cover image ACM Conferences
        IMC '21: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet Measurement Conference
        November 2021
        768 pages
        ISBN:9781450391290
        DOI:10.1145/3487552
        This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

        Sponsors

        In-Cooperation

        • USENIX Assoc: USENIX Assoc

        Publisher

        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        Published: 02 November 2021

        Check for updates

        Qualifiers

        • Research-article

        Funding Sources

        Conference

        IMC '21
        IMC '21: ACM Internet Measurement Conference
        November 2 - 4, 2021
        Virtual Event

        Acceptance Rates

        Overall Acceptance Rate 277 of 1,083 submissions, 26%

        Upcoming Conference

        IMC '24
        ACM Internet Measurement Conference
        November 4 - 6, 2024
        Madrid , AA , Spain

        Contributors

        Other Metrics

        Bibliometrics & Citations

        Bibliometrics

        Article Metrics

        • Downloads (Last 12 months)142
        • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)17

        Other Metrics

        Citations

        Cited By

        View all
        • (2023)Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling DomainsProceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems10.1145/35794407:1(1-28)Online publication date: 2-Mar-2023
        • (2022)Retroactive identification of targeted DNS infrastructure hijackingProceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference10.1145/3517745.3561425(14-32)Online publication date: 25-Oct-2022

        View Options

        View options

        PDF

        View or Download as a PDF file.

        PDF

        eReader

        View online with eReader.

        eReader

        Get Access

        Login options

        Media

        Figures

        Other

        Tables

        Share

        Share

        Share this Publication link

        Share on social media