Fernando P. Santos
ABSTRACT
Explaining cooperation between individuals is a fundamental scientific endeavour. Similarly, devising mechanisms that encourage autonomous agents to cooperate with each other is a central topic in multiagent systems. Indirect reciprocity (IR) emerged as the most elaborated mechanism of cooperation discovered, involving the moral assessment of actions, the spreading of reputations and agents that care about the social image of others. In this context, the way actions are judged and reputations are attributed depends on the socially adopted norms that define what actions (and under which contexts) are reckoned as Good or Bad. It remains an open question which norms are able to maintain high levels of cooperation in a multiagent system, composed by a finite number of agents that may often behave unpredictably. We employ computational and mathematical methods (inspired in evolutionary game theory) to explore which social norms are able to promote cooperation in a multiagent system. We seek to extend the state of art by introducing new models of IR that consider a finite number of agents that are given the opportunity to randomly explore the strategy space and that may commit errors of different nature.
References
- C. Bicchieri. The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge University Press, 2005.Google Scholar
- N. Griffiths and M. Luck. Changing neighbours: improving tag-based cooperation. In Proceedings of the 9th AAMAS, pages 249--256. IFAAMAS, 2010. Google Scholar
- C.-J. Ho, Y. Zhang, J. Vaughan, and M. Van Der Schaar. Towards social norm design for crowdsourcing markets. In AAAI Workshops, 2012.Google Scholar
- J. Morales, M. Lopez-Sanchez, J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, M. Wooldridge, and W. Vasconcelos. Automated synthesis of normative systems. In Proceedings of the 2013 AAMAS, pages 483--490. IFAAMAS, 2013. Google Scholar
- M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437(7063):1291--1298, 2005.Google Scholar
- A. Peleteiro, J. C. Burguillo, and S. Y. Chong. Exploring indirect reciprocity in complex networks using coalitions and rewiring. In Proceedings of the 2014 AAMAS, pages 669--676. IFAAMAS, 2014. Google Scholar
- D. G. Rand and M. A. Nowak. Human cooperation. Trends in cognitive sciences, 17(8):413--425, 2013.Google Scholar
- F. P. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, and F. C. Santos. Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates. Scientific Reports, 6(37517), 2016.Google Scholar
- F. P. Santos, F. C. Santos, and J. M. Pacheco. Social norms of cooperation in small-scale societies. PLoS Comput Biol, 12(1):e1004709, 2016.Google Scholar
- B. T. R. Savarimuthu and S. Cranefield. Norm creation, spreading and emergence: A survey of simulation models of norms in multi-agent systems. Multiagent and Grid Systems, 7(1):21--54, 2011. Google Scholar
- S. Sen and S. Airiau. Emergence of norms through social learning. In IJCAI, volume 1507, page 1512, 2007. Google Scholar
- M. Wooldridge. An introduction to multiagent systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2009. Google Scholar
Index Terms
Social Norms of Cooperation in Multiagent Systems
Comments