Abstract
Existing research work has identified a new class of attacks that can eavesdrop on the keystrokes in a non-invasive way without infecting the target computer to install malware. The common idea is that pressing a key of a keyboard can cause a unique and subtle environmental change, which can be captured and analyzed by the eavesdropper to learn the keystrokes. For these attacks, however, a training phase must be accomplished to establish the relationship between an observed environmental change and the action of pressing a specific key. This significantly limits the impact and practicality of these attacks. In this paper, we discover that it is possible to design keystroke eavesdropping attacks without requiring the training phase. We create this attack based on the channel state information extracted from the wireless signal. To eavesdrop on keystrokes, we establish a mapping between typing each letter and its respective environmental change by exploiting the correlation among observed changes and known structures of dictionary words. To defend against this attack, we propose a reactive jamming mechanism that launches the jamming only during the typing period. Experimental results on software-defined radio platforms validate the impact of the attack and the performance of the defense.
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Index Terms
- Wireless Training-Free Keystroke Inference Attack and Defense
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