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Wireless Training-Free Keystroke Inference Attack and Defense

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Published:08 February 2022Publication History
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Abstract

Existing research work has identified a new class of attacks that can eavesdrop on the keystrokes in a non-invasive way without infecting the target computer to install malware. The common idea is that pressing a key of a keyboard can cause a unique and subtle environmental change, which can be captured and analyzed by the eavesdropper to learn the keystrokes. For these attacks, however, a training phase must be accomplished to establish the relationship between an observed environmental change and the action of pressing a specific key. This significantly limits the impact and practicality of these attacks. In this paper, we discover that it is possible to design keystroke eavesdropping attacks without requiring the training phase. We create this attack based on the channel state information extracted from the wireless signal. To eavesdrop on keystrokes, we establish a mapping between typing each letter and its respective environmental change by exploiting the correlation among observed changes and known structures of dictionary words. To defend against this attack, we propose a reactive jamming mechanism that launches the jamming only during the typing period. Experimental results on software-defined radio platforms validate the impact of the attack and the performance of the defense.

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          cover image IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
          IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking  Volume 30, Issue 4
          Aug. 2022
          471 pages

          1558-2566 © 2022 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

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          • Published: 8 February 2022
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